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Abstract
This paper examines the characteristics of loans to Japanese borrowers using a relatively
unexplored, contract-specific data set.  We show that loan spreads for Japanese borrowers are
substantially lower, on average, than for borrowers with similar characteristics from France,
Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States.  Moreover, we find that Japanese banks
are willing to offer lower-priced loans to a riskier set of Japanese borrowers than are foreign
banks within the same market.   Japanese banks also vary their pricing less across borrowers than
foreign banks, suggesting that they do not distinguish good risks from bad.  Taken together, our
pricing results do not support the argument that Japanese banks suffer simply because of poor
economic conditions.  Instead, the findings suggest that the problems at Japanese banks stem
from the behavior of the banks themselves.1
Japanese banks and their borrowers have been the focus of numerous empirical studies.
For instance, researchers have studied the costs and benefits of relationship banking within the
Japanese banking system (Aoki and Patrick, 1994; Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein, 1990, 1991;
Gibson, 1995, 1997; Weinstein and Yafeh, 1998; Kang and Stulz, 2000), the role of Japanese
banks in corporate governance (Kang and Shivdasani, 1995, 1997; Morck and Nakamura, 2000;
Dinç, 2000; Hoshi and Kashyap, 2001), and the impact of deregulation and the subsequent crisis
on the functioning of the financial system (Bayoumi, 1999; Yamori and Murakami, 1999; Hoshi
and Kashyap, 1999; Hoshi and Patrick, 2000; Spiegel and Yamori, 2003; Brewer, Genay, Hunter,
and Kauffman, 2003).  Despite the knowledge gained from these papers, there is scant empirical
evidence on the characteristics of loan contracts between Japanese firms and their banks.  This
paper incorporates relatively unexplored, contract-specific data on bank loans to large borrowers
to help fill this gap.  Specifically, we examine how the pricing and terms of loans to Japanese
borrowers vary as a function of borrower and bank characteristics, and compare loans to Japanese
borrowers with loans made to similar non-Japanese companies.
Roughly two decades have past since Japan began deregulating its financial sector.  The
period since then has been tumultuous for both banks and their borrowers.  During the 1980s,
large, high-quality firms migrated from banks to capital markets, forcing banks to lend to a wider
scope of customers.  Much of the new lending went to small firms and to the real estate sector,
substantially increasing banks’ credit exposure (Hoshi and Kasyhap, 1999).  Bank earnings
declined through the beginning of the period and then fell precipitously after the collapse of the
Japanese asset price “bubble” around 1990.  Today, Japanese banks continue to be plagued by
severe asset-quality problems and low profitability.  Non-financial firms have fared no better.
Over the last ten years, firms have experienced lower growth, profitability, and productivity than
their peers in other developed countries.  Average bankruptcy rates are currently at a near all-time
high and large, listed firms are declaring bankruptcy at rates that are unprecedented by Japanese
standards.2
Against this background, an analysis of the lending practices of Japanese banks could
yield better insight into why Japan’s banks, and its economy in general, have struggled so much
over the last decade.  Competing views have been put forth to explain the low profitability of
Japanese banks.  Pundits on one side of the debate believe that banks’ low profitability results
primarily from poor macroeconomic conditions.  They argue that Japan’s sluggish economy lacks
enough profitable investment opportunities, or that falling prices and near-zero nominal interest
rates prevent banks from earning a fair return on their investment.  Pundits on the other side of
the debate believe that Japanese banks are unprofitable because they are unable, or unwilling, to
exploit profitable lending opportunities.  They maintain that government participation and
interference, regulatory forbearance, and close historical ties between banks and borrowers create
an environment where banks “compete” to keep deadbeat borrowers alive to the detriment of
healthier borrowers.  Arguments on the latter side often imply that it is the dysfunctional banking
sector – characterized by low profitability – that impedes economic growth in Japan, not the
reverse.
The data collected for this paper can help distinguish between these competing
arguments.  By relating contract-specific information to characteristics of the borrower and by
comparing the characteristics of loans to Japanese borrowers with those to non-Japanese
borrowers, we can observe how Japanese banks price and supply loans to their domestic
customers.  For example, do Japanese banks relate their loan prices to the riskiness of the
borrower, or do prices depend on other characteristics?  How do loan spreads of Japanese
borrowers compare with non-Japanese borrowers?  How often are loans rolled over and who
benefits from the refinancing?  Our sample enables us to answer such questions.  More
importantly, our sample includes loans to Japanese borrowers from foreign (i.e., non-Japanese)
banks, the characteristics of which can be used as benchmarks for studying the causes of low
Japanese bank profitability.  If Japanese banks are unprofitable because of weak macroeconomic
conditions, then foreign bank loans should be similarly unprofitable.  However, if the low profits3
reflect bank-specific or Japanese-specific factors, then we might expect foreign banks to make
more profitable loans.
We obtain our sample of loans from Loanware, an archive of over 120,000 loan deals
from around the globe. Loanware is primarily marketed as a source of information for banks that
want to participate in loan syndicates.  For that reason, most of the loans in the data set are
syndicated loans, though bilateral loans and “club” deals are also included.  A typical Loanware
record contains a wealth of information about each credit agreement, including borrower name
and nationality, loan pricing and other contract details, the purpose of the loans, borrower
information such as credit ratings, and the identity of the banks arranging, managing, and
participating in the loan.  The data set includes 874 loans to Japanese borrowers dating back to
1980, though nearly two-thirds of the observations come from the last three years in the sample,
1999-2001.
Though highly detailed in nature, there are several reasons why our data might not
properly represent the typical loan to a Japanese business.  First, data on loans to large firms are
likely to differ from loans made to small and medium-sized firms, which today represent a
growing share of the business at Japanese banks.  Second, focusing on Loanware data likely
overstates – even for large firms – the importance of syndicated lending in Japan, which has
grown in popularity but still represents a small fraction of total lending in the country.
1 Third,
Japanese loans are underrepresented in Loanware relative to other developed countries.  The 874
Japanese loans are a small fraction of the 120,000+ deals available in the database.  Fourth, the
methods Loanware uses to collect loan information makes it hazardous to draw conclusions based
on time series patterns in the data.  For instance, the larger quantity and improved accuracy of
observations in the latter years of the database likely reflects both improvements in disclosure that
have led to better sampling, and changes in the global structure of bank lending.  Separating these4
two effects could be challenging.  Despite these drawbacks, we believe the data provide an
important glimpse at the nature of loans to Japanese borrowers. Indeed, a separate goal of this
paper is to identify some of the pitfalls in using these types of data.
We show that loan spreads for Japanese borrowers are substantially lower, on average,
than for borrowers with similar characteristics from four “benchmark” countries: France,
Germany, the United Kingdom (U.K.), and the United States (U.S.).  Thus, banks appear to
underprice loans to Japanese borrowers.  Of more interest, we document a significant difference
in the way that Japanese and foreign banks price loans to Japanese borrowers.  Japanese lenders
charge a median loan spread that is 25 to 50 basis points lower than foreign lenders, even after
controlling for a variety of loan and borrower characteristics.  In fact, Japanese borrowers from
foreign banks are less risky, on average, than Japanese borrowers from Japanese banks, but are
willing to pay higher loan prices from foreign banks.  Moreover, we find that Japanese banks vary
their pricing less across borrowers than foreign banks, suggesting that they do not distinguish
good risks from bad.  Taken together, our pricing results do not support the argument that
Japanese banks suffer simply because of poor economic conditions.  Instead, the findings suggest
that the problems at Japanese banks stem from the behavior of the banks themselves.
We also show that the maturity structure of loans to Japanese borrowers changed
significantly in 1998, a year in which Japanese regulators imposed stricter disclosure standards on
banks.  Starting in that year, the median maturity of loans to Japanese borrowers shortened to 12
months, compared with an average maturity of 72 months for loans originated during the years
1980-1997.  No similar decline occurred among borrowers in the benchmark countries.  We argue
that the change in maturity structure likely reflects the combined effects of an increase in the
popularity of loan commitments in Japan and a shift in the perceived risk of Japanese borrowers.
                                                                                                                                                                            
1 For instance, the 2001 flow of syndicated loans to Japanese borrowers relative to the amount of
commercial and industrial loans outstanding at Japanese banks in 2001was 2.9%.  By comparison, the flow
of syndicated loans to U.S. borrowers in 2001 was 114.0% of outstanding C&I loans.5
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 provides some background
information and reviews related literature.  Section 3 provides an overview of the Loanware
database.  Section 4 contains summary comparisons of Japanese borrowers to borrowers from the
four other developed nations and then moves on to compare the pricing characteristics of
domestic and foreign bank loans to Japanese borrowers.  Section 5 uses cross-sectional
regressions to further investigate the pricing differences between Japanese and foreign banks.
The section also conducts a more detailed examination of the decline in loan maturity observed
during the late 1990s.  Section 6 concludes.
2.  Background and Related Literature
Figure 1 compares the profitability of U.S. and Japanese banks over the period 1989 to
2001 using an adjusted measure of return on assets (AROA).  The adjustment takes out
fluctuations in profits due to taxes and changes in the value of securities holdings and real estate,
and thus provides a measure of  “core profitability.”
2  The figure shows that U.S. banks’ AROA
veraged 1.5% over the period, with profits increasing throughout most of the 1990s.  Though not
shown in the figure, European banks were likewise profitable over the decade of the 1990s.
3 By
contrast, Japanese banks averaged zero AROA over this period, suffered four years of losses, and
experienced no year in which AROA exceeded 0.5%. Although Japanese analysts often tie the
poor performance of Japanese banks to the 1990-91 collapse of land and stock following the
bursting of the Japanese “bubble,” Figure 1 shows that Japanese banks were unprofitable prior to
the price collapse.  In fact, Hoshi and Kashyap (2000) show that core profitability began to
decline in Japan in the 1950s, and accelerated in the late 1980s as financial deregulation began to
take effect.
                                                          
2 Specifically, the numerator of the adjusted return on assets ratio is net interest income +  noninterest
income – noninterest expenses – additions to loan loss provisions.
3 Banks in France, Germany, and the U.K., had an average AROA of 0.5% in 1990 and 0.8% in 1999
(OECD Bank Profitability, 2002).6
The extant literature has, to varying degrees, attempted to address the debate over the
causes of low profitability at Japanese banks.  For example, Koo (2001) argues that the primary
cause of poor bank profitability is the corporate debt overhang left by the collapse of the Japanese
asset pricing bubble.  Sugiura (2002) attributes the problems at banks to a slumping economy,
general price deflation, a greater burden of debt repayments, and an inability of small companies
to restructure.  But Hoshi and Kashyap (1999) find that macroeconomic variables cannot account
for the secular decline in core profits that began in the 1950s, and that fluctuations in the Japanese
economy explain little of the variation in bank profits over the last 40 years.  Instead, Hoshi and
Kashyap document a negative relation between bank profitability after deregulation and a bank’s
reliance on traditional sources of income (such as interest on loans) before deregulation.  They
also find that banks fare more poorly after deregulation if they relied heavily on customers that
could easily shift to bond financing after the onset of deregulation.  Overall, Hoshi and Kashyap
conclude that Japanese banks have not adapted well to competitive changes spawned by
deregulation.
Japanese banks may be slow to adapt because the incentives of bank managers are not
properly aligned with profit maximization.  Japanese banks often establish close ties with their
customers.  While these relationships can reduce information asymmetries and lead to more
efficient financing, they can also work to bind banks and their customers to protect each other at
all costs.  The relationships are often solidified through so-called “stable-shareholding”
agreements whereby banks, borrowing firms, and their affiliates cross hold equity shares.  These
arrangements act as explicit barriers to takeovers, making it difficult to oust poor managers at
banks and their client firms.  Banks and affiliated financial institutions, such as life insurance
companies, also formulate “double-gearing” arrangements in which banks supply subordinated
loans to the institution in exchange for a capital investment in the bank.  Fukao (2003) argues that
double-gearing between banks and life insurance companies has contributed to the weakening
condition at both types of institutions.7
One particular manifestation of the close ties between banks and their customers is the
practice of “evergreening” – that is, continually rolling over or refinancing – loans to poorly
performing borrowers.  There are several reasons why banks may continue to evergreen loans to
unprofitable borrowers.  First, bank managers may be sensitive to the negative impact that a loan
denial would have on the borrower and decide to forego the unpleasant consequences.  Second,
close borrowers may threaten the bank with retaliation if cut off, either by selling their current
equity stake in the bank, or by refusing to provide capital support to the bank in the future.
4
Third, by refinancing weak borrowers, banks do not have to classify the borrowers as “non-
performing,” thereby avoiding the credit costs associated with increased loan loss provisions.
Fourth, government authorities might pressure banks to continue lending to unprofitable
borrowers to prevent a credit crunch, or because borrowers exert political pressure on authorities.
Peek and Rosengren (2002) study the allocation of credit to a large panel of Japanese
firms during the 1990s.  They find that main banks are more likely to offer additional loans to
borrowers that are deteriorating than to otherwise similar borrowers that are healthy.  A similar
relation holds for borrowers that are members of the same keiretsu as the bank.  Borrowers are
not accorded the same benefits from non-bank lenders, or when they are not members of a
keiretsu.  Peek and Rosengren argue that this behavior is consistent with the evergreening of
loans to banks’ closest customers.
Evergreening could put a drag on economic growth if it favors unprofitable borrowers at
the expense of healthy borrowers with valuable growth opportunities.  Caballero, Hoshi, and
Kashyap (2003) argue that evergreening could have a negative impact on economic growth even
when financing is not rationed to healthy borrowers.  They reason that evergreening keeps alive
firms that would normally be killed off by competitive pressures.  Such “zombie” firms could
drive down the profit potential of healthy firms by offering below-cost prices in product and labor
                                                          
4 Dvorak (2002) uses the relationship between Ashikaga Bank and its local customers to highlight the
practice of keeping a borrower finaned so that the borrower can, in turn, provide capital for the bank.8
markets.  In other words, evergreening can prevent creative destruction and promote unfair
competition in the real sector.
Overall, the papers discussed above focus on the relation between bank profitability and
economic growth in Japan.  These papers tend to point to distorted incentives created by close
relationships and the practice of evergreening as the culprits for low bank profitability.  However,
to date, none of the studies directly investigates the practices that propagate the low profitability.
The contract-specific information utilized in this paper enables us to conduct just such an
investigation.  In the next section, we introduce the source of the contract-specific data,
Loanware, and discuss the potential drawbacks in sampling from the data set.
3.  Overview of Loanware
Loanware is a global database that tracks loan contracts on medium and large-sized
borrowers.  It is used primarily by banks interested in participating in loan syndicates, or for
obtaining detailed information on particular segments of the syndicated loan market.  Dealogic, a
company owned jointly by Euromoney Publishers and Compusoft Software, maintains the
Loanware database.  A typical record in Loanware includes the borrower’s name, industry,
nationality, and a variety of credit ratings; the loan type, amount, maturity, purpose, pricing and
fee information, whether or not the loan is secured with collateral, the identity of bank(s)
arranging the loan, and the identity of non-arranger banks participating in the loan.  Records are
created for each “tranche”, or part of a loan, and any one loan deal, or “facility” in Loanware
parlance, can contain multiple tranches.
5  The information currently fed into Loanware comes
from a variety of sources, including government filings, company annual reports, and public news
releases, but Dealogic obtains most of the data – particularly for borrowers outside the U.S –
directly from the banks arranging the loan deals.  These banks compete for positioning in “league
tables” and therefore have a strong incentive to document as many deals as possible.  For loans9
from the 1980s and early 1990s, Dealogic relies on information contained in archived stories
from Euromoney and Euroweek.  For that reason, the pre-1990s data should be treated with extra
caution. Loanware contains some traditional bilateral and “club” loan observations, but
syndicated loans clearly dominate the database.
Table 1 reports the distribution across years of the 874 loans to Japanese borrowers on
Loanware through 2001.  The table also reports similar distributions for borrowers from France,
Germany, the U.K, and the U.S., and for the entire Loanware universe.  In subsequent tables, we
use the combination of observations from the four countries – France, Germany, U.K., and U.S. –
to create a benchmark for comparison with Japanese borrowers.
U.S. borrowers dominate the Loanware universe with 68,134 loans, accounting for over
half of all the observations.  U.K. borrowers are also well represented with 8,367 loans,
comprising about 7% of the total universe. With the exception of the years 2000 and 2001, Japan
has the fewest borrowers in the data set of the five countries listed in Table 1, but over the entire
sample period Japanese borrowers are about as well represented as borrowers from Germany,
which contributed 881 observations.  The fact that Japan and Germany have large banking
systems yet contribute relatively few borrower observations to the data set likely reflects the
countries’ strong reliance on bilateral rather than syndicated loans.
Table 1 also reports the annual proportion of Japanese loans in which the lead arranging
bank is foreign.  A foreign bank has its primary headquarters or a parent bank located outside of
Japan.  The pattern in the table hints at the “evolution” in the collection of Japanese loans by
Loanware.  In the early part of the sample, foreign lenders arrange nearly all of the loans.
Apparently, Japanese banks were reluctant during this period to divulge information on their
bilateral bank relationships.  Japanese-led loans begin to appear in 1988 and constitute at least
half of the sample thereafter.  But the Japanese-led loan records fail to identify most of their
                                                                                                                                                                            
5 The Dealogic terminology differs from that of its competitor, Loan Pricing Corporation, which maintains
the Dealscan database.  In Dealscan, a “facility” refers to an individual component of the loan (i.e., a10
borrowers by name until after 1997, suggesting banks provided information conditional on
borrower anonymity.  After 1997, this practice ceases and all borrowers are identified by name.
At that point in time, Dealogic began requiring that borrowers be identified as a condition for
having loan deals count toward a bank’s league table score.
With some insight into the nature of the Loanware sample, we now turn to comparing the
loan contract characteristics of Japanese borrowers to the characteristics of contracts to borrowers
in the benchmark countries, France, Germany, the U.K., and the U.S.
4.  Comparing Japanese borrowers to borrowers in benchmark countries
In Table 2, we provide an annual comparison of Japanese borrowers to French, German,
U.K., and U.S. borrowers, referred to collectively as the “benchmark borrowers”, over the 1980-
2001 period using five separate characteristics related to the loan contract or the borrower.  We
describe each of the characteristics below.  Not all borrower records contain complete
information for every characteristic.  For this reason, we list at the bottom of Table 2 the number
of observations and percentage of all records available for each characteristic over the sample
period.
The first characteristic is the median value of the borrower’s current (as of September
2002) Moody’s long-term debt rating, measured across all borrowers with ratings information.
The current Moody’s rating provides us with a uniform measure of credit risk, though it has at
least two drawbacks.  First, only those firms that are large and informationally transparent enough
to issue public debt are rated.
6  The bottom of the table shows that only 32.3% of the Japanese
observations and 21.5% of the benchmark observations contain Moody’s ratings information.
The unrated borrowers are likely to be smaller and more informationally opaque than the rated
borrowers.  Second, the current rating may not reflect the riskiness of the borrower at the time the
loan was originated, particularly for loan agreements in the 1980s.  Unfortunately, Loanware has
                                                                                                                                                                            
Loanware “tranche”), not the entire loan deal.11
only scant information on the rating of a borrower at the time of the loan.  Therefore, we rely on
the current rating, assuming that persistence in the quality of the borrower through time makes the
current rating informative about credit risk at the time of the loan.
The second characteristic is the median amount of the loan tranche, measured in millions
of U.S. dollars.
7  The loan provides a proxy for the size of the borrower obtaining the loan, as
larger borrowers are more likely to obtain larger loans.  Because size is a measure of credit risk,
smaller-sized loans should typically be riskier loans.  However, the relative size of loans can vary
for reasons other than risk – for example, the purpose of the loan could influence its size – so one
should be cautious about making inferences based only on the loan amount.  One advantage to
using loan amount as a proxy for riskiness is that nearly all of our observations contain loan
amount information.
The third characteristic is the median term or maturity of the loan, measured in years
from the signing date.  Like the loan amount, the maturity can provide a signal of the riskiness of
the loan, as riskier borrowers are likely to get shorter-maturity loans (see Flannery, 1994).  But
maturity will also be related to the type of the loan.  Holding borrower other borrower
characteristics constant, loan commitments are typically of a shorter maturity than term loans.
Maturity could also be related to the propensity to evergreen, since keeping the term short enables
the bank to more easily roll over a loan.
The fourth characteristic is the proportion of sample loans that are recorded as secured
with collateral.  The interpretation of collateral as a risk variable is especially ambiguous.    On
one hand, holding other risk characteristics constant, the presence of collateral should lower the
riskiness of the loan.  Theories also suggest that low-risk borrowers might pledge collateral to
distinguish themselves from high-risk borrowers.
8 On the other hand, banks are more likely to
                                                                                                                                                                            
6 Moody’s does provide bank debt credit ratings for firms with no public debt, but the frequency of such
ratings is small.
7 All loans are converted to U.S. dollars using the exchange rate on the signing date of the loan agreement.
8 For example, see Besanko and Thakor (1987).12
require collateral from riskier borrowers.  Empirical evidence on the use of collateral suggests
that the latter effect tends to dominate.
9 But the type and purpose of the loan, and the ease with
which the underlying assets can be evaluated and seized in case of bankruptcy, will also influence
whether or not collateral is pledged.
In addition to its ambiguous interpretation as a risk variable, there is an acute sampling
problem with the collateral variable.  Loanware records a “yes” in the collateral field of a loan
record if the information source for the loan mentions explicitly that the loan is secured with
collateral, otherwise the field is left blank.  Therefore, Loanware does not distinguish between a
loan agreement that is unsecured and a loan that is missing information about the security status
of the loan.  For the statistics in Table 2, we count all blank fields to mean “unsecured,” so that
our estimates clearly understate the true proportion of loans that are secured.
10  However, we can
use the collateral data for comparison purposes if we assume that the recording errors do not vary
systematically across borrower nationality.
The final characteristic is a median measure of loan price, what we term the “loan
premium.”  For the cross-country comparisons, we define the loan premium to be the interest
spread on loans priced off the London interbank offer rate (LIBOR), the standard basis for pricing
syndicated loans.  The loan premium includes the interest charged on the drawn portions of the
loan, plus utility and facility fees.  Thus, the loan premium reflects both interest and non-interest
sources of revenue.  Some records also contain pricing information that uses benchmarks other
than LIBOR.  For example, Japanese borrowers also receive loans priced off of the Tokyo
interbank offer rate (TIBOR).  Other records contain no pricing information at all.  Out of the
sample of 874 Japanese borrowers, 19.5% contain LIBOR pricing information, compared with
55.8% of the benchmark borrowers.
                                                          
9 See Berger and Udell (1990), Strahan (1999), and Booth and Booth (2002).
10 For example, Carey, Post, and Sharpe (1998) estimate that 70% of U.S. Dealscan bank loans are secured.
By comparison, for loans originating in 2001, Loanware implies that only 29% of U.S. borrowers were
secured.13
The bottom of Table 2 summarizes the five characteristics by calculating the average
median value across the entire 22 years in the sample, and across the 1990-2001 subsample.
Given the uneven sampling methods used in the 1980s, we focus much of our attention on the
1990-2001 subsample.  We calculate the average Moody’s ratings by first converting annual
median ratings to an integer using a linear scale (i.e., Aaa = 1, Aa1 = 2, . . ., C = 21).  We then
compute the average values, round to the nearest integer, and reconvert to the Moody’s credit
rating scale.  For averages that are halfway between two ratings, we report the ratings that
straddle the average.
The sample of Japanese borrowers appears to be less risky than the sample of rated
benchmark borrowers.  The average of the median Moody’s ratings for Japanese borrowers over
the entire sample period is Baa1, compared with an average between Baa2 and Baa3 for the
benchmark countries.  A rating of Baa3 is the lowest rating a firm can receive and still be
considered “investment grade.”  The relative difference in risks between borrowers in Japan and
the benchmark countries holds for most years in sample.  For instance, the median benchmark
borrowers over the years 1990-2001 are rated “junk” while the median Japanese borrower is still
rated investment grade. Japanese loans also tend to be larger, on average, than loans in the other
countries and tend to have an average maturity that is slightly longer than the benchmark loans.
The lower risk of the Japanese borrowers could suggest that the pool of Japanese borrowers is
less risky, on average, than non-Japanese borrowers, or it could suggest that banks in the
syndicated loan market are more selective when lending to Japanese borrowers than when lending
to benchmark borrowers.  The fact that a substantially higher proportion of the sample of
Japanese borrowers is rated suggests that banks require higher standards for the Japanese
borrowers receiving syndicated loans.
The average loan maturity for Japanese borrowers of nearly six years during the 1990s
masks a big drop in maturity at the end of the sample period.  Specifically, beginning in 1998, the
median maturity falls to one year. In fact, the prevalence of one-year maturities is so high in these14
years that nearly half of the entire sample (47%) of Japanese loans has a maturity of one year.  No
such decline occurs in the maturity of loans to benchmark borrowers.
There are at least three potential explanations for this large change in the maturity
structure of Japanese borrowers.  First, the fraction of loans made under commitment increased
drastically in Japan during the late 1990s and loan commitments tend to be of a shorter maturity
than traditional term loans.  The proportion of Japanese loans made under commitment increased
to an average of 63% during the 1998-2001 period from 32% over 1980-1997 after a law change
made commitment lending explicitly legal in Japan.  The high proportion of loans made under
commitment during the 1998-2001 period compares with an average of 44% of loans in the
benchmark countries during the same period.  But the median maturity of loans made under
commitment in the benchmark countries from 1998 to 2001 is 2 years, equivalent to the median
maturity among benchmark borrowers earlier in the sample.  Moreover, 26% of Japanese non-
commitment loans during the 1998-2001 period also had a maturity of one year or less.
Therefore, while the increase in the popularity of loan commitments probably contributed to the
decline in average maturity in the late 1990s, it cannot completely explain the incidence of one-
year maturities.
11
Second, the incidence of short-maturity loans could indicate that Japanese banks began in
the late 1990s to actively structure loan agreements to facilitate evergreening.  The Financial
Reconstruction Law (FRL) of 1998 greatly expanded the disclosure obligations of Japanese
banks.  In particular, the FRL required banks to classify loans according to according to asset
quality into one of four categories: “normal,” “in need of attention”, “at risk”, or “unrecoverable.”
Based on the classifications, banks were then required to set aside a specific proportion of loan
                                                          
11A similar explanation relates to Basel Accord rules regarding the risk weighting of loan commitments.
These rules exempt the undrawn portion of loan commitments with maturities less than one from capital
charges.  That is, the undrawn portion of the commitment receives a zero-weight in calculating risk-
weighted assets.  Because Japanese banks have been capital-constrained since the late 1990s (see Fukao,
2003), one could argue that they have a stronger incentive when offering loan commitments to exploit the
Basel rule that maximizes their reported risk-weighted capital.15
loss reserves against the value of the loan, net of any collateral.
12  The classification systems,
which are based on bank self-assessments, separate borrowers according to whether they are past
due on a loan payment, and how far past due they are.
13 Loans from borrowers that are three
months past due, or worse, are labeled “nonperforming.” Under the FRL, loans that are
“restructured” to a borrower experiencing difficulties are also to be classified as nonperforming,
but in practice very few loans are classified as restructured.  Therefore, by offering loans with one
year of maturity (or less), banks could evergreen loans to keep them “performing” and avoid
costly additions to loan loss reserves.
Third, the change in maturity structure could reflect a shift in how banks perceive, and
react to, the credit risk of Japanese borrowers.  Following the closure or nationalization of three
large Japanese bank and requisite capital injections into most other large banks between 1997 and
1999, banks could have become more wary of entering into long-term contracts with their
borrowers.  By shortening the maturity of their loans, banks reduce their credit exposure.
Moreover, a shorter maturity keeps borrowers on a “short leash,” improving the monitoring
ability of the banks (Flannery, 1994).  In the next section, we attempt to distinguish between the
three explanations by estimating the relation between maturity and a set of variables meant to
proxy for the risk and performance of the borrower.
Japanese loans are also much less likely to be secured with collateral than benchmark
loans.  This feature of the sample is surprising given that Japanese banks have historically
emphasized collateral value when making loans.  One potential explanation for the finding might
be that Japanese banks rely on buildings and land for collateral, whereas the collateral backing the
                                                          
12 There are actually two borrower classifications described under the FRL. Banks are obliged to report
classify loans, as described above, on an unconsolidated basis.  Banks can also volunteer to report “risk
management loans,” which may be consolidated, and can include credits other than loans.  The two
reporting methods, however, produce numbers of similar magnitude.  Banks must set aside reserves
equivalent to 15% of the net book value (book value – collateral value or specific reserves) of  “needs
attention” loans, 70% of the net value of “risk” loans, and 100% of the net value of “unrecoverable” loans.
For more information on disclosure requirements, see Bank of Japan (2000) and Financial Services Agency
(2001).16
types of loans in Loanware  – inventory, receivables, etc. – is uncommon in Japan.  Another
possibility is that Japanese banks underreport the security status of loans to Loanware relative to
other banks.  However, discussions with the Dealogic representatives that manage Loanware have
uncovered no reason why reporting from Japanese banks would be different.
Finally, the loan premium charged on Japanese loans tends to be much smaller, on
average, than the premium charged on benchmark loans.  For example, over the 1990-2001
period, the average Japanese loan premium of 80 basis points is less than half the 164 basis point
benchmark loan premium.  The difference in the amounts charged on loans could be due to
differences in risk.  The average benchmark Moody’s credit rating of Ba1 is two notches lower
than the average Japanese rating of Baa2, and the benchmark loans are smaller and more likely to
be secured, which could indicate that the loans made to benchmark borrowers are riskier.
On the other hand, the differences in loan prices could also reflect differences in how
loans are priced in Japan after controlling for the riskiness of the borrower.  For example, banks
may also keep prices low on loans that they evergreen, either because strong relationship
commitments hinder the ability to terminate loans, or because banks wants to keep loans
performing to increasing costly loan loss provisions.  The fact that banks have been so
unprofitable for so long – and that profit outlooks for the near future are equally dismal –
suggests that Japanese banks are pricing loans below profitable levels.
To gain more insight into how Japanese banks set their loan terms, we now focus on how
loan contracts offered by Japanese banks to domestic borrowers differ from those of non-
Japanese banks.  That is, we limit our sample to Japanese borrowers and compare the contract
characteristics of loans from domestic (i.e., Japanese) banks to loans from foreign (i.e., non-
Japanese) banks.
                                                                                                                                                                            
13 Borrowers in the “in need of attention” category are three months past due, in the “risk” category six
months past due, and in the “unrecoverable” category borrowers are bankrupt or near bankrupt.17
Table 3 provides summary statistics of the five loan characteristics of Japanese
borrowers, sorted by the nationality of the bank arranging the loan.  Specifically, we identify a
loan as originating from a “domestic” lender if at least one of the arranging banks is
headquartered in Japan.  Otherwise, we label the lender as “foreign.”  For this table, we increase
the number of borrowers with credit ratings by supplementing the Moody’s ratings with similar
ratings from Standard & Poor’s (S&P) because S&P rates some borrowers that are not covered by
Moody’s.  For reporting and averaging purposes, we express the S&P ratings in terms of the
Moody’s scale (i.e., S&P AAA = Moody’s Aaa, S&P AA+ = Moody’s Aa1, and so on).  For
borrowers with both a Moody’s and S&P rating, we average the two ratings and round down to
the riskier credit rating.  This procedure nets 16 additional Japanese borrowers with credit ratings.
We also report two additional measures of loan price that incorporate more information
on revenue earned from non-interest fees.  “Drawn return” starts with the loan premium and then
adds participation and underwriting fees, expressed as a percentage of the loan amount.  It
measures the yield above LIBOR earned by a bank that receives all possible fees associated with
originating and managing the loan, assuming that the borrower draws down the entire amount of
the loan.  “Undrawn return” equals the sum of upfront fees, facility fees (which are paid annually
on the total amount of a loan), and commitment fees (which are paid on the undrawn portion of a
loan) expressed as a percentage of the loan amount.  Undrawn return estimates the return a bank
would earn on the undrawn portion of a loan commitment.
Table 3 suggests that foreign lenders lend to observationally less risky borrowers than
Japanese banks.  Borrowers from non-Japanese banks are rated higher by Moody’s and S&P, and
have larger loans with longer terms to maturity.  In fact, a comparison of the median loan
maturities indicates that Japanese banks offer loans with one year of maturity much more often
than foreign banks.  There is also less dispersion, as measured by standard deviation, in the risk
characteristics of loans arranged by foreign lenders.  For instance, the standard deviation in the18
credit ratings of firms borrowing from foreign banks during the 1990-2001 period is 2.4 notches,
compared with 2.9 notches for firms borrowing from domestic banks.
Despite the fact that foreign banks lend to a less risky group of Japanese borrowers, they
charge a higher average loan premium and vary prices more, compared with Japanese banks.  The
median spread above LIBOR for non-Japanese banks is 75.0 basis points during the 1990-2001
period compared with 47.5 basis points for Japanese banks.   Including participation and
underwriting fees only widens the gap between the two types of banks.  Foreign banks’ median
drawn return is 85 basis points above LIBOR, or 10 basis points higher than their median loan
premium.  In contrast, Japanese banks earn no extra premium, on average, from participation and
underwriting fees.  Meanwhile, the foreign loan premium has a standard deviation of 72.4 basis
points compared with only 48.6 basis points in the prices of Japanese banks.  Non-Japanese banks
also tend to require collateral more often (18% of the time from 1990-2001) than Japanese banks
(2% of the time).
If foreign banks tend to charge higher rates, vary their prices more, and demand more
collateral on the loans they offer than Japanese banks, and if foreign banks are more picky about
who they lend to, then why do Japanese companies borrow from foreign banks?  In other words,
why are foreign lenders not priced out of the Japanese market?  There are two potential
explanations.  First, high quality Japanese borrowers may be willing to pay a premium for loan
approval from a high quality bank.  Billett, Flannery, and Garfinkel (1995) show that borrower
stock price reactions to loan announcements are positively related to the quality of the lending
bank, as measured by the bank’s credit rating.  Indeed, some Japanese companies are precluded
from borrowing from their own country’s banks because of the banks’ poor quality.  Dvorak
(2001) reports that internal guidelines at Sony Corporation actually prohibit the company from
borrowing from any bank with a Moody’s bank financial strength rating of C, which is well19
above the highest rating for a large Japanese bank.
14  Second, the Japanese market could be
segmented into firms that foreign banks are willing to lend to, i.e, high-quality firms, and firms
that only Japanese banks are willing to finance, i.e., unprofitable firms with pessimistic future
prospects.  Somewhat perversely, interest rates in the Japan-only market could be lower than the
high-quality market because the poor quality firms that are kept alive in the Japan-only market
are unable to pay high interest rates.
In the next section, we extend our exploration of the pricing differences between
Japanese and non-Japanese banks by controlling for cross-sectional variation in characteristics of
the loan and borrower.  We then use a similar cross-sectional framework to investigate the
curious drop in Japanese loan contract maturities that began in 1998.
5.  Cross-sectional regressions
We now introduce a set of exogenous loan and borrower characteristics that could help
explain some of the variation in loan price and maturity across Japanese borrowers.  Our ultimate
goal is to use these characteristics to isolate significant differences in contract terms between
Japanese and foreign banks.  The characteristics are exogenous in the sense that realizations of
the characteristics are unlikely to be influenced by the contract terms themselves.  Therefore, the
regressions in this section are “reduced form.” We group the characteristics into three categories:
exogenous loan variables, borrower performance variables, and borrower credit risk variables.
The exogenous loan variables are characteristics of the loan that could help explain
variation in loan price and maturity, but are determined independently of the contract terms.  We
distinguish these variables from potentially endogenous loan variables, such as the loan amount
and whether or not the loan is secured, that are set simultaneously with price and maturity.  The
first exogenous loan variable is a dummy variable indicating whether or not the loan is made
                                                          
14 Mitsubishi Tokyo Financial Group, with a rating of D-, has the highest fiancial strength rating of the big
four Japanese banks. Of the ten largest publicly listed banks in Japan, only Shizuoka Bank(9
th largest,
financial strength rating = C+) and Chiba Bank (10
th largest, financial strength rating = D) have higher
ratings than Mitsubishi Tokyo (see Moody’s Investor Service, 2002).20
under commitment, defined to be all loan tranches labeled by Loanware as a “line of credit,”
“revolver,” “mix of facilities,” or “revolving/term.”  The liquid nature of a loan commitment
instrument suggests that its contract terms may differ from traditional “term loans.”  James and
Smith (2000), Kashyap, Rajan and Stein (2002), and Gatev and Strahan (2002) argue that part of
what makes a bank special is its ability to provide liquid loans in the form of loan commitments.
The second loan variable is a dummy variable set equal to one when a loan is denominated in
yen.  We add this variable to control for the possibility spreads that low nominal yields in Japan
“squeeze” loan spreads to be lower on yen-denominated loans.  We then include two dummy
variables related to the purpose of the loan.  One variable takes on the value of one if the loan is
to finance an acquisition or a Leveraged buyout (LBO), the other equals one when the loan
refinances existing debt, or is used as part of a recapitalization.  Booth and Booth (2002) find that
U.S. syndicated loan spreads tend to be higher on loans that finance a takeover or LBO, and lower
on refinancings and recapitalizations.  Loanware is the source for all four of these variables.
Given that Japanese banks may have incentive to alter loan agreements to facilitate the
evergreening loans, we use the borrower performance variables to proxy for the quality of the
borrower.  The variables include three dummies that identify whether the borrower is in the retail,
real estate, or construction sector.  These sectors are commonly recognized in Japan as the
weakest and most reliant on continued bank support.  The other variable is the one-year change in
the equity price of the borrower over the calendar year prior to the signing of the loan. We adopt
this variable because large declines in stock price could signal that a borrower is distressed.  The
industry dummies are from Loanware.  The equity price data, which are available only for firms
with publicly-traded equity, come from Datastream.
The borrower risk variables include two equity market measures of risk, equity volatility
and the market value of equity, and the current credit rating of the borrower (either Moody’s,
S&P, or an average of the two), converted to an integer using a linear scale.  We adopt the equity
volatility variable as an ex-ante measure of the riskiness of the firm’s cash flows and the market21
value of equity as a measure of firm size.  The credit rating provides a direct assessment of the
credit risk of the borrower, but as mentioned earlier, the current ratings may not reflect the
condition of the borrower at the time of the loan.  We calculate equity volatility using daily data
for three years ending in the year prior to the signing date, and the market value of equity using
the last trading day in the year prior to the signing date.  The equity volatility and market value of
equity variables are calculated from information in Datastream, while the credit ratings are from
Loanware.
Table 4 presents the results from ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of loan price
on the exogenous characteristics using different measures of loan price, and for various cuts of
the sample based on the availability of data.  In addition to the exogenous characteristics
discussed above, the reported regressions include two additional dummy variables.  The first is a
foreign bank dummy; it equals one when a foreign bank arranges a loan and zero when a
domestic bank leads the loan.  The second is a time dummy that takes the value of one if a loan
observation is from the four-year period 1998 to 2001.
The first three columns use the all-inclusive drawn return as the measure of loan price,
column (4) uses the loan premium above LIBOR, and column (5) adds in observations that price
the loan premium off the Tokyo interbank offer rate (TIBOR).  All but one of the columns
(column (3))) excludes the credit rating variable because so few borrowers are rated.  Column (1)
also excludes those variables calculated with equity data.  Moreover, we restrict all reported
regressions to the more reliable 1990-2001 sample.  Regressions that include the 1980-89 data are
similar.  We also exclude the real estate dummy from all loan price specifications because no firm
from that industry survives the cuts required for the regressions.  For similar reasons, we exclude
the construction industry variable from the specification that only includes borrowers that are
publicly traded and rated by Moody’s and S&P (column 3).
Due to the paucity of pricing information on Japanese loans, the regression contain
between 64 and 186 observations – a small fraction of the original 874 loans.  Nonetheless,22
several interesting patterns emerge in the data.  Most importantly, foreign banks earn significantly
more on loans to Japanese borrowers than Japanese banks do, even after controlling for a variety
of loan and borrower and characteristics.  The Table 4 estimates imply that foreign banks earn a
drawn return that is 25 to 50 basis points more than Japanese banks.  Foreign banks charge more,
on average, across the sample of all borrowers in column (1), than they do across the subset of
firms that are publicly-traded (2), and the publicly-rated firms are charged more than the subset
that are traded and rated by Moody’s or S&P in column (3).  The differences in pricing across
these columns probably reflect differences in risk that are not modeled, with the column (3)
borrowers being the least risky of the three samples.  But the results are also consistent with the
idea that bank lending to the most transparent firms and internationally active firms is more
competitive than the loans that are “down market” to more opaque, local firms.  It is this latter set
of firms that are most likely to required favored treatment from Japanese banks.
Consistent with risk-pricing behavior, smaller firms and firms with lower credit ratings
(i.e., higher values of the integer representation of the credit rating) pay more on their loans.  For
instance, the credit rating estimate in column (3) implies that every ratings notch downward adds
11 basis points to the cost of the loan.  Holding all else constant, banks also charge anywhere
from 6 to 50 basis points less for loan commitments than for term loans, depending on the sample
investigated. Loan commitments and term loans are priced nearly the same among borrowers that
are publicly-traded and rated, so the largest pricing differences exist among those privately-held,
which tend to be smaller, riskier, and more informationally opaque.
There is also some evidence that poorly performing borrowers can be charged lower rates
than healthier borrowers, a sign that Japanese banks are helping to keep zombie firms alive.  First,
firms in the retail industry appear to be charged a lower loan spread than firms in other industries.
However, upon further breakdown of the sample into foreign and domestic banks (not shown), we
find that the negative estimate on the retail industry variable is due to foreign banks, not Japanese
banks.  Second, the positive and marginally significant estimate associated with one-year equity23
price changes suggests that banks charge lower spreads on firms with falling stock prices.   While
this result is intriguing, it is not statistically significant in the other specifications.
We now turn to a cross-sectional analysis of loan maturity.  In the last section, we
presented three potential explanations for the anomalous decline in Japanese borrower loan
maturities that began in 1998:  (1) a sharp rise in the proportion of loans made under commitment
in the late 1990s, (2) an increase in evergreening behavior after loan disclosure requirements were
expanded, and (3) a general increase in the perceived riskiness of Japanese borrowers.  We use
cross-sectional regressions to provide some insight into the viability of these explanations.
Table 5 presents the results from OLS regressions of loan maturity, measured in years, on
the exogenous characteristics.  Following the earlier regressions, we limit the reported results in
Table 5 to loan observations from the 1990-2001 sample period.  Including the 1980-89 data
produces results that are very similar. As in Table 4, column (1) excludes the equity-based
variables and the credit rating variable.  Because loan maturity information exists for much of the
sample, this column contains the largest number of observations.  Adding the equity variables
(column (2)) and the credit rating variable (column (3)) substantially reduces the number of
observations in the regression.
The main results from the table can be summarized as follows.  First, loan commitments
have a significantly shorter maturity than term loans.  The estimates imply that the maturity on
loan commitments can be from six months to three years shorter than term loans, holding all other
variables constant.  Thus, loan commitments are associated with shorter-term maturities and
lower interest rate spreads (Table 4).  Strahan (1999) and Booth and Booth (2002) document a
similar result. Second, none of the borrower performance variables (the three “weak” industry
indicators and the one-year change in equity price) are statistically significant.  Third – and
somewhat surprisingly – foreign banks offer shorter maturity loans than domestic banks, holding
other variables constant.  In fact, a comparison between the time dummy estimates in columns (4)
and (5) shows that foreign banks are responsible for much of the reduction in loan maturities24
during the 1998-2001 period.  The point estimates suggest that foreign bank loan maturities fell
by six months more than domestic bank loan securities during that period.  This finding could
point to an increased wariness by banks to lend long to Japanese borrowers after the peak crisis
years 1997-1999.
Overall, the abrupt fall in loan maturities that began in 1998 appears to be driven by two
factors.  First, Japanese firms greatly increased their use of loan commitments in the late 1990s
and loan commitments have shorter maturities. Second, banks – especially foreign banks – shifted
the maturity structure of their loans to Japanese borrowers, perhaps due to general changes in the
perception of risk profile of Japanese borrowers.   Because much of the decline in loan maturities
appears to originate from for foreign banks, and because borrower performance does not appear
to be related to maturity, our results are not consistent with the idea that banks shortened
maturities to facilitate evergreening as disclosure requirements became stricter.
6.  Conclusion
Japanese banks continue a decade-long struggle to dig themselves out of a mountain of
poorly performing loans.  Since 1992, these banks have written off $650 billion of bad loans,
equivalent to 16% of their current GDP, yet most analysts believe that banks will have to realize
losses of a similar magnitude to rid themselves of their existing bad loans.  Why have Japanese
banks been so unprofitable?  This paper uses a relatively unexplored, global database of loan
contracts to help answer that question.  By relating the contract-specific information to
characteristics of the borrower and by comparing the characteristics of loans to Japanese
borrowers with those to non-Japanese borrowers, we observe how Japanese banks price and
supply loans to their domestic customers.  Our sample includes loans to Japanese borrowers from
foreign (i.e., non-Japanese) banks, the characteristics of which can be used as benchmarks for
studying the causes of low Japanese bank profitability.  If Japanese banks are unprofitable
because of weak macroeconomic conditions, then foreign bank loans should be similarly25
unprofitable.  However, if the low profits reflect bank-specific or Japanese-specific factors, then
we might expect foreign banks to make more profitable loans.
We obtain our sample of loans from Loanware, an archive of over 120,000 loan deals
from around the globe.  The data set includes 874 loans to Japanese borrowers dating back to
1980, though nearly two-thirds of the observations come from the last three years in the sample,
1999-2001.  Though highly detailed, our data might not properly represent the typical loan to a
Japanese business.  For example, most of the Loanware contracts are from syndicated loans and
syndicated lending has only recently become popular in Japan.  It still remains a small fraction of
total lending in the country.  For this reason, the paper attempts to identify some of the pitfalls
from using the Loanware data.
We document a significant difference in the way that Japanese loans are priced and, in
particular, show that Japanese banks underprice loans to their domestic borrowers compared the
pricing by foreign banks.  Japanese lenders charge a median loan spread that is 25 to 50 basis
points lower than foreign lenders, even after controlling for a variety of loan and borrower
characteristics.  In fact, Japanese borrowers from foreign banks are less risky, on average, than
Japanese borrowers from Japanese banks, but are willing to pay higher loan prices from foreign
banks.  Moreover, we find that Japanese banks vary their pricing less across borrowers than
foreign banks, suggesting that they do not distinguish good risks from bad.  Taken together, our
pricing results do not support the argument that Japanese banks suffer simply because of poor
economic conditions.  Instead, the findings suggest that the problems at Japanese banks stem
from the behavior of the banks themselves.
We also show that the maturity structure of Japanese loans by Japanese banks changed
significantly in 1998, a year in which Japanese regulators imposed stricter disclosure standards on
banks.  Starting in that year, the median maturity of Japanese bank loans shortened to 12 months,
compared with an average maturity of 72 months for loans originated during the years 1980-
1997.  No similar decline occurred among borrowers in the benchmark countries.  We argue that26
the change in maturity structure likely reflects two factors.  First, borrowers greatly increased
their use of loan commitments beginning in 1998, shortly before Japanese law codified the
legality of offering loan commitments, and loan commitments have a shorter maturity than term
loans.  Second, banks – particularly foreign banks –  appear to have reacted to increases in the
perceived risk of Japanese borrowers by shortening the maturity of their loans.27
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Median Baa2 52.58 1.00 48.75 48.75 17.50
Mean Baa2 295.03 3.29 63.16 64.92 20.68 0.02
Std Dev 2.8 notches 834.80 3.48 45.92 46.83 18.43
Number of observations 145 594 559 32 32 71
Foreign banks
Median Baa1 92.05 3.00 75.00 85.00 17.50
Mean Baa1 213.84 3.53 94.41 105.80 33.91 0.16
Std Dev 2.3 notches 401.16 3.42 69.26 76.74 60.94
Number of observations 152 275 255 137 137 143
Sample: 1990-2001
Domestic banks
Median Baa2 51.03 1.00 47.50 47.50 17.50
Mean Baa2 295.20 3.30 67.65 67.50 20.68 0.02
Std Dev 2.9 notches 843.14 3.50 48.64 48.64 18.32
Number of observations 138 577 544 25 25 71
Foreign banks
Median Baa1 114.22 2.00 75.00 85.00 17.50
Mean Baa1 254.64 3.38 98.14 108.853 33.78 0.18
Std Dev 2.4 notches 444.45 3.54 72.44 79.45 64.26
Number of observations 110 213 203 117 117 12433
Table 4. Loan Premium Regressions: Japanese borrowers, 1990-2001




















































































































































Adj. R-squared 0.186 0.370 0.316 0.365 0.199
Number of
Observations
138 105 64 105 186
***significant at a 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *significant at at 10% level.34
Table 5.  Loan Maturity Regressions: Japanese borrowers, 1990-2001








































































































































Adj. R-squared 0.503 0.224 0.207 0.127 0.394
Number of
Observations
749 186 93 84 102
***significant at a 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *significant at at 10% level.3
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